On the existence of stable roommate matchings

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August undefined, 2024

Web7 de abr. de 2012 · We characterize the computational complexity of checking the existence and computing individual-based stable matchings for the marriage and roommate … Web3 de nov. de 2024 · Chung K (2000) On the existence of stable roommate matchings. Games Econ Behav 33:206–230. Article Google Scholar Diamantoudi E, Miyagawa E, Xue L (2004) Random paths to stability in the roommate problem. Games Econ Behav 48:18–28. Article Google Scholar

On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings - ScienceDirect

WebStable matchings were introduced in 1962 by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley to study the college admissions problem. The seminal work of Gale and Shapley has motivated hun-dreds of research papers and found applications in many areas of mathematics, computer science, economics, and even medicine. This thesis studies stable matchings in graphs … Web3. Restrictions on preferences that admit stable matchings In their paper, Gale and Shapley (1962) speciﬁcally point out that it is not the case that every roommate problem has a stable matching. This has spurred a signiﬁcant amount of re-search aimed at identifying preference restrictions that grant the existence of stable roommate matchings. port of orlando cruise parking

An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem

WebWe compare different preference restrictions that ensure the existence of a stable roommate matching. Some of these restrictions are generalized to allow for … Web1 de nov. de 2000 · This paper identifies a condition called “no odd rings” that is sufficient for the existence of stable roommate matchings in the weak preferences case. Web1 de nov. de 2000 · This paper identifies a condition called “no odd rings” that is sufficient for the existence of stable roommate matchings in the weak preferences case. It shows … iron hill waymart

Absorbing sets in roommate problems - ScienceDirect

A Review of the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings

Web2 de jun. de 2024 · On the existence of stable roommate matchings. Games and Economic Behavior 2000 Journal article DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0779 EID: 2-s2.0-0347748257. Part of ISSN: 08998256 Contributors: Chung, K.-S. Show more detail. Source: Kim Sau Chung ... Web1 de mar. de 2024 · We prove that any roommate problem with externalities has a stable partition and that a stable matching exists if there is a stable partition without odd rings. … port of orlando live webcamWeb1 de jun. de 2014 · This paper identifies a condition called “no odd rings” that is sufficient for the existence of stable roommate matchings in the weak preferences case. port of orlando cruise terminal

"Web1 de jul. de 2004 · We first show that although stable matchings may not exist, a weakly stable matching always exists in a roommate problem. Then, we adopt a solution concept based on the credibility of the deviations for the roommate problem: the bargaining set. We show that weak stability is not sufficient for a matching to be in the bargaining set. " - On the existence of stable roommate matchings

On the existence of stable roommate matchings

Properties of Stable Matchings - University of Waterloo

WebStable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence … WebIn the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. ... "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November. Ravi Kannan, 1987.

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Web1 de set. de 2010 · The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce maximum irreversible matchings and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al., 2006) and maximum stable matchings (Tan 1990, 1991b). These solution concepts are all core consistent. Web1 de dez. de 1985 · At least one stable matching exists for every stable marriage instance, and efficient algorithms for finding such a matching are well known. The stable …

WebStable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics and tastes (types). Web1 de nov. de 2000 · Abstract This paper identifies a condition called “no odd rings” that is sufficient for the existence of stable roommate matchings in the weak preferences …

WebWe compare different preference restrictions that ensure the existence of a stable roommate matching. Some of these restrictions are generalized to allow for indifferences as well as incomplete prefer. ... Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, … Web1 de out. de 2000 · Recently, Chung (1998) has shown that the absence of ‘odd rings’, i.e. rings such that the number of elements is odd, is a sufficient condition for showing the …

Web1 de set. de 2013 · We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, based on the “robustness” of deviations (i.e., blocking coalitions). We call a deviation from a matching robust up to depth k, if none of the deviators gets worse off than at the original matching after any sequence of at most k subsequent deviations. We say that a matching is stable …

http://www.columbia.edu/%7Epc2167/RoommatePbm-29Mars2012.pdf port of orlando webcamWebAlcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(3), pages 417-435, May. port of orlando cruisesWeblems all feasible matchings that maximize social surplus are stable. This is not true in roommate problems; but we show how any roommate problem can be \cloned" in order to construct an associated bipartite problem. We then exploit this insight to prove existence of stable matchings in roommate problems with even numbers of agents within each type. port of orlando floridaWeb1 de out. de 2000 · We are interested in stable matchings. Definition 2. A matching μ is stable if it is individually rational and if it is not blocked by any pair of agents (X, x)∈ F × M. We denote the set of stable matchings μ for a given marriage problem (F, M, ≻) by S. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that for any problem (F, M, ≻), a stable matching exists. port of orleansWebAlcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for … port of orlando hotelsWeb6 de out. de 2005 · Abstract. An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (sr) need not admit a stable matching. This motivates the problem of finding a matching that … iron hills armyWeb1 de jul. de 2004 · We first show that although stable matchings may not exist, a weakly stable matching always exists in a roommate problem. Then, we adopt a solution … iron hills mastiffs